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Firms often give away free goods with the product that they sell. Firms often give stock options 
to their top management and other employees. Mixing these two practices—giving stock options 
to consumers who buy the firm’s product—, creates a deadly brew. Large numbers of consumers 
can be lured into buying this product, giving the entrepreneur huge profits and the consumers a 
growing profit share. But this is a camouflaged Ponzi that will ultimately crash. By analogy it is 
argued that the common practice of giving stock options to employees can be a factor behind 
financial crashes.   
   
 
 
Key words: marketing, stock options, financial scams, product bundling 









Acknowledgements    I am grateful to Levon Barsheghyan, Dan Benjamin, Brian Dillon, Nick 
Kiefer, Annemie Maertens, Asani Sarkar, Karl Shell, Ariel Rubinstein, and Jorgen Weibull for 
comments and suggestions.     2 
 
A Marketing Scheme for Making Money off Innocent People: 
A User’s Manual 
 
 
1.  The Idea 
 
 
This paper outlines a new marketing strategy that can generate large profits by selling a 
product that may be of questionable value to the consumer. All one needs is a little ingenuity, 
and a lack of moral qualms. Both these qualities, especially the latter, are available in ample 
supply in today’s world. The scheme in question, while novel, belongs to a large class of related 
scams that have been used in the past. What is interesting is that this scheme works even when 
consumers  are  fully  rational.  The  particular  marketing  strategy  suggested  here  does  not 
technically  violate  the  law,  even  though  it  does  lie  barely  beyond  the  boundary  of  what  is 
unquestionably legal. Borrowing a term from the Economist magazine, it is best to describe this 
marketing strategy as ‘alegal’. The law will no doubt catch up on it with a lag, as it does on most 
scams. In the mean time, here is the user’s manual. 
  The scheme combines two widely used marketing strategies (both of which are legal in 
most nations) but in combining them creates a deadly brew. First, it is a standard ploy in 
marketing to give away something for free (or what guileless consumers take to be free) with the 
product that is being sold. We often get free music systems with the new car, free CDs with the 
new music system, and a free ounce of toothpaste with the 3.8 oz tube. Of course, it is not 
evident what “free” means in these cases. Recently, when I bought a Sudoku book, I was touched 
to find that, in addition to the 298 Sudokus in the book, the publisher had given two “bonus 
Sudokus”, without charging for them. 
  Second, we are all familiar with modern corporations and firms doling out handsome 
amounts  of  stock  options  to  their  top  management  and,  increasingly,  even  to  rank-and-file 
employees. Basically this amounts to giving employees the right to buy the company’s stocks at 
a low price, thereby creating employee interest in increasing the price of shares.   
  The marketing scheme being suggested here is to give away ‘free goods’ with the main 
product being sold; and to make those free goods stock options. In other words, what is being 
proposed is the idea of giving stock options to those buying the product being sold by the firm. It   3 
is like Honda handing out Honda shares to each person who buys a Honda car. If the price of the 
good is appropriately set and the amount of shares given out with each product is worked out in a 
particular way (explained below), this can create a huge demand for the product and can cause 
profits to rise steadily, giving the entrepreneur who starts this scheme a large amount of profit. 
Essentially,  this  brew  of  two  standard  practices,  mixed  in  carefully-calculated  proportions, 
creates a strange chemistry which is best thought of as a camouflaged Ponzi. I shall refer to this, 
in brief, as a ‘Camoponzi’.    
  Here is how the scheme works. Suppose you are an entrepreneur starting to manufacture 
some product – cars, trucks, refrigerators.  It can be anything.  Let me call it by the neutral name 
of ‘hotash’. With each unit of hotash the consumer who buys it will be a given some shares of 
your company for free. If the proportions are worked out right – and I am about to show you how 
it can be done – then it is possible to flood the market with hotashes. Consumers will find it 
worthwhile to buy huge amounts of hotashes and you as the entrepreneur will earn large profits. 
Like all such financial scams, it works as long as everybody believes that it will work. 
 
2.  The Arithmetic 
 
Here is the user’s manual.  I will later show why there will be demand for it from the 
consumers and how it can turn in huge profits.  Let us suppose the cost of producing each unit of 
hotash is c.  Since this can be a pretty worthless good, c will be low.  I shall simply assume 
0 ³ c .  You, the entrepreneur, should fix the price of hotash (for all times to come) at p (> c).  
Hence, every time a unit of hotash is sold, it generates a profit of   . p º -c p  
  Time is broken up into periods, for instance, months. In period 1, the entrepreneur should 
offer for sale 1 unit of hotash and, along with it, a half-share of the company’s profit. The 
remainder of the share remains with the entrepreneur.  Hence, in period 1, the entrepreneur earns 
2 / p  and the consumer gets one hotash and earns   . 2 / p  
  In period 2, let the entrepreneur manufacture and sell 2 hotashes.  Each hotash is offered 
with a share of 1/8 = ½
3 of the company’s profit.  So from period 2 onwards, ½ profit goes to the 
buyer  of  period  1,  1/2
3  share  of  profit  goes  to  each  of  the  two  buyers  in  period  2  and  the 








3 = - -    4 
  Now, let me take the inductive leap and specify behavior in period m, for each period m = 
1, 2, 3, …, endlessly. The number of hotashes manufactured and sold should be 2
m-1.  With each 
hotash, give away a profit share of  .
2
1
1 2 - m  Note that for m = 1 and m = 2, this is exactly what 
was described above. 
  Let me now show why everybody—the  consumers and the entrepreneur—gains from 
these offerings. Let us first consider the entrepreneur. By the time period m comes, she has given 
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+ + +  , which is, as is 
easily checked, equal to  .
2
1
1 m -  Hence, in period m, she gets to keep  
m 2
1
 share of the profit.  In 
period m, total profit is  . 2
1p
- m  Therefore, the profit earned by the entrepreneur is  2 / p . Since  m 
has vanished from the expression, it follows that the entrepreneur earns a profit of  2 / p  in every 
period.  Since   , 0 2 / > p  this is clearly a scheme for endless profiteering.  
  What we have to show next is that it is worthwhile for the consumers to buy the hotashes 
that are supplied by the entrepreneur. 
  Assume all hotashes get sold.  Then the total profit in period 1 is p , in period 2 is  p 2  
and in period m is  . 2
1p
- m  Hence, the consumer who buys the product in period 1 earns profits in 
periods 1, 2, 3, 4, ... , as follows:  




            (1) 
Since  0 > p  and this is an exponentially growing series, it makes sense for him to buy the hotash 
even if the hotash has no intrinsic value to him. 
  Now consider the cohort of consumers that buys the good in period m.  The profit earned 
by such a consumer in periods m, m + 1, … is as follows: 
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  This again is a series that begins with a positive number and then gets doubled each 
period and so is unbounded from above.  It is reasonable to pay a price, namely p, in any period 
m and acquire a hotash along with the share options that are on offer in that period. 
  Formally, what has just been described is equilibrium behavior in an infinite-horizon 
game. If other consumers are expected to buy the product, then it is indeed worthwhile for each 
consumer to buy the product
1. However, it is also true that, if no one else is expected to buy the 
product in the future, then it is not worthwhile for a consumer in a particular period to buy the 
product. In other words, there exists another equilibrium in which the scheme fails. This must not 
be taken to detract from the fact that the equilibrium in which the scheme succeeds is robust in 
the sense of being a strict equilibrium, that is, one in which a consumer who deviates unilaterally 
and does not buy the product actually does worse. 
  It should be clarified that, while the outcome described above is an equilibrium in the 
sense of being associated with subgame perfect behavior, no claims are being made of this being 
a market equilibrium. Indeed, describing a market equilibrium with Ponzis is problematic. It is 
easy to think of another firm undercutting the one described above by giving consumers a better 
deal and making more profit. This is because one can make the rise in profit over time steeper. 
The problem arises from the fact that there is no theory to guide us on how much one can do this 
without  causing  a  breakdown  in  consumer  confidence.  Fortunately,  describing  a  market 
equilibrium is not the objective of the paper; the objective is to show that a firm can sell a dud 
product at a positive price and make a profit, by developing a marketing strategy which is a 
camouflaged Ponzi.   
  I have glossed over a little on the detail of the individual consumer’s decision making. 
Basically, for a consumer facing a choice of whether or not to buy a hotash, along with the free 
shares, on offer is a problem of choosing between infinite streams of returns. Buying a hotash 
generates an infinite stream of returns that comes from the share that one gets, plus the pleasure 
of driving or playing with or whatever one is supposed to do with a hotash. Let us suppose that 
this generates the infinite utility stream x1, x2, x3, … . If she decides not to buy a hotash, she gets 
the infinite stream -p, 0, 0, … . Declaring one of these streams as better than the other is the 
standard  problem  of  choosing  between  infinite  streams.  If  we  are  to  make  this  comparison 
                                                 
1 Even in macroeconomic models of bubbles, which are constructed very differently, we can see this bootstrapping 
property. The piece of an asset is high today because it is expected to be high tomorrow and this generates a 
behavior which makes the expectations rational (see Shell, Sidrauski and Stiglitz, 1969).   6 
without any discounting, we tend to run into some tricky problems (Basu and Mitra, 2003). 
However, one way around this is to be prepared to deal with incomplete preference orderings. A 
reasonable one is to use the standard idea of utilitarianism (see, for instance, Maskin, 1978) and 
extend it, incompletely, to infinite streams. This was done in Basu and Mitra (2007). According 
to this ‘utilitarian criterion’ an infinite stream,  x ≡ ( x1, x2, … ) is preferred to y ≡ ( y1, y2, … ) if 
there exists an integer t such that  x1 +  x2  …+ xt   >  y1 + y2  …+ yt , and, for all k > t, xk > yk. 
  It is now easy to see that, using the utilitarian criterion, it is worthwhile for consumers to 
buy hotashes, along with the share offerings, no matter how little the value of the hotash itself. 
  We get the same result if we use the more familiar overtaking criterion, which has been 
known from the time of Frank Ramsey, analyzed and axiomatized (Brock, 1970), and used in 
infinite-horizon game theory (Rubinstein, 1979). The reason the above argument remains intact 
with the overtaking criterion is that, as shown in Basu and Mitra (2007), if a stream x is preferred 
to a stream y, according to the utilitarian criterion, then x is preferred to y under the overtaking 
criterion (even though the reverse implication does not follow).  
  Finally, what happens if we want to use the familiar method of discounted present value? 
If the discount factor is  ), 1 , 0 ( Î d  the present value of stream (3) is given by: 
       




For  d  close to 1 this will be a large number. Moreover, since hotash can be of zero intrinsic 
worth its cost of production can be very low.  If c is close to zero then   p  is close to p. It is 
immediately clear that while the scheme described above is a specific one, for every  1 < d , we 
can redesign a scheme to make the profit growth sufficiently exponential for hotash to be a good 
buy for all consumers. Hence, the scheme described here is one in which, if all consumers decide 
to buy the product whenever it is offered, then all consumers will find it worthwhile to buy and 
you the entrepreneur will make a large profit. 
   
3.  The Variants 
 
The scheme that I have described has many variants. For the most part these will be 
pretty obvious and anybody planning to use this should be able to work out minor variants of it, 
maybe with the help of his in-house economist or finance specialist. Just to give a flavor of what   7 
is possible, suppose that you want to avoid the rapid growth in the number of hotashes sold in 
each period. This is easily done. Pretend that all the hotashes that you have at the start of the 
project and into the endless future are numbered, 1, 2, 3 and so on. Let us suppose you have 
decided to manufacture and sell ι hotashes in each period. Then here is what you can do. Sell 
hotash number 1 exactly with the package of shares that you would do in the above scheme. That 
is the person buying it gets ½ the share of all profits. Those who buy the hotashes numbered 2 
and 3, namely the next 2 hotashes, get the shares as specified above, namely, 1/8
th of all profits.  
Those who buy the next 4 hotashes, that is, hotashes numbered 4, 5, 6 and 7, will get a profit 
share of 1/32 of all profits, as above (check for m = 3). And so on. 
  This will cause a slight change in the calculation of returns since, within a period, there 
will be different people who would have got hotashes with different amounts of shares. But the 
essential argument remains the same. For you the entrepreneur the calculation is virtually the 
same.  If  consumers  use  the  utilitarian  criterion  described  above,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  it  is 
worthwhile for them to buy the product, since the returns stream will eventually outdo the price 
of the hotash.  If consumers are maximizers of discounted present value, then we do have a 
problem in that the discount factor has to, for later consumers, go endlessly close to 1. But of 
course this is just one variant of the above scheme. There are other variants where this problem is 
avoided. 
  One  can  also  design  other  kinds  of  share  options  give  away,  so  as  to  enable  the 
entrepreneur to collect even higher profits. One method is to put into action what may be called a 
“fading share.” This is a share that erodes over time. In other words, it gives a profit share of s1 
in the first period that the consumer gets the share, a share of s2 in the next period, a share of s3 in 
the third period after buying the product and so on, where s1  ≥ s2  ≥  s3  ≥ ….. By modifying 
these fading shares in different ways an entrepreneur endowed with some enterprise and ample 
greed can do a lot for himself. What all these variants share is the feature of being Camoponzis. 
 
4.  The Ethics 
 
The value of this paper is, hopefully, not what it can do for an enterprising entrepreneur 
but because it shows up the world for what it is. There are people who have accumulated great 
wealth by making genuinely worthwhile contributions to society, but there are many who have   8 
accumulated wealth by developing innovative pricing and marketing schemes, some of which are 
camouflaged Ponzis. They often contribute to taking our economy into unusual highs and then 
precipitate a collapse, as we have seen in the recent global financial crisis (Akerlof and Shiller, 
2009; Basu, 2009).
2  
This  same  ethical  point  is  made  powerfully  in  Rubinstein  and  Spiegler  (2008).  The 
motivation in their paper is similar to the one in this paper. They construct a model in which a 
businessman can sell a dud by “creating a harmful sequence of bilateral transactions” (p. 237), 
which the buyer accepts. Hence, they show how, contrary to popular perception, the entrepreneur 
who sells a product widely does not have to be creating value. Despite this common normative 
concern, the analytical structure of their model is, however, very different from the one in this 
paper for their model assumes that consumers are less than fully rational.  
The scheme I have outlined above shows some of the ways in which common business 
practices can generate profits for entrepreneurs without creating any value. At times, even the 
practitioners do not fully  understand  what they are doing.—Shiller  (2000) has written about 
“naturally occurring Ponzis”. It is today common to give out share options to employees and 
often also to the consultants and lawyers who advise the company. One reason why some of 
these people agree to work for the firm as employees or as outside consultants is the lure of the 
future profits. What is implicitly happening in these cases is not totally different from what has 
been  described  above.  A  bubble  is  being  created  with  the  help  of  a  Camoponzi  that  could 
eventually blow up. 
Without going into full details, here is how it would work. Suppose an entrepreneur has a 
project which has very low productivity. It could be a consulting firm in which people work hard 
but what they produce is of little true worth. Suppose each person who works full time in this 
firm produces output equal to value β. Suppose each person’s labor costs c, where c/2 < β < c. 
Clearly the firm does not produce net value. Yet, it can run and earn profits, if the entrepreneur is 
willing to give stock options in cleverly worked out proportions to the employees. Suppose he 
sets the salary of each employee at c/2. If people take up this job offer, then, with each employed 
person the firm will earn a profit of β – c/2 > 0. As the firm grows by employing more and more 
                                                 
2 The market for hotash also helps us get an unusual insight into the positive economics of financial crisis. The close 
connection between liquidity and crisis has been noted and written about, with the view being often taken that a 
crisis cannot occur with fully rational agents (for an analytical survey in the context of the current crisis, see Allen 
and Carletti, 2008). In the market for hotash an illusion of wealth and liquidity is created among consumers, which 
ultimately leads to a crash. Interestingly, this happens with fully rational agents.    9 
workers, it can earn more and more profits. The only catch is: why will anybody work for this 
salary? This is where stock options come in. Suppose the firm employs 1 person in period 1 and 
gives her some share of the profit; then doubles the number of employees the next month and 
offers each worker a share of the profit; then again doubles the workforce the following month 
and again gives out stock options. The salary is throughout kept constant at c/2. It is possible to 
show that by working out the stock option amounts in a way similar to the scheme described in 
my marketing model the job can be made attractive to each employee. This happens because the 
stock options are really a camouflaged Ponzi, just like my scheme described above. This paper 
would have served its purpose if it enables us to craft policies to prevent ordinary consumers and 
employees from being exploited.    
  The reason why giving shares to employees does not always lead to a crash is because 
productive activity can at times “catch up” with a Ponzi, and diffuse it
3. Even in my scheme, if as 
an entrepreneur you use the profit to start up new productive ventures and you strike lucky with 
one of those, it is possible for you to diffuse the Ponzi process. The same is true of the practice of 
wider and wider distribution of share options. These have the potential for a crash (and may even 
have contributed to the crash of 2007), but, since most firms are also trying to be productive, 
they can diffuse the expanding Camoponzi before it crashes.  
  The legality of Ponzis is not as open-and-shut a matter as is usually made out to be. Often 
those who run Ponzis, such as Bernard Madoff or the pioneer, Charles Ponzi (1882-1949), do not 
reveal to investors that it is a Ponzi. They put up a false front of productive investment taking 
place with the investors’ money. That would be illegal, if for no other reason, because it involves 
deceit. But if someone runs a Ponzi or a Camoponzi, such as the one described above, by being 
fully transparent about what is being done with the money, it is not obvious that rational agents 
should not invest in it. The main reason for this is that there is no well-defined point at which a 
Ponzi collapses. All Ponzis and Camoponzis involve an ever-growing set of transactions, with 
customers making repeat purchases. Since, ultimately, the speed of this gets unmanageably rapid, 
we know that Ponzis will ultimately crash
4.  The trouble is that this, in itself, does not make it 
                                                 
3 Furthermore, in infinite period models, it is possible, up to a point, to increase the income and consumption of the 
current generations without causing any decline in the consumption of future generations simply by each generation 
borrowing from the next (see Shell, 1971). 
4 For this reason my scheme would not work in a world with a finite termination date. The argument would unwind 
for the same reason as in Tirole (1982)—see also Allen and Gorton (1993).    10 
irrational for the consumer to buy hotashes since there is no well-defined date when it crashes
5. It 
can be common knowledge that it will eventually crash but it can still be rational for consumers 
to participate in it. We know this from related arguments in the literature about bubbles and 
crashes (see Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003). 
  If consumers are willing to participate in a Ponzi with eyes wide open, it is not obvious 
that it should be banned. One can, instead, make the neoclassical argument that there should 
simply be full transparency. On the other hand, one can reasonably argue that individuals are 
unable to process the full complexity of Ponzis and also have self-control problems, and so they 
need to be protected from themselves; hence, Ponzis should be illegal.     
  The scheme I describe in this paper has the problem (or, in case you are the entrepreneur, 
the advantage) that it will not be easy to prove in practice that it is a Ponzi. Modern economics 
tells us that the value of a good is nothing but the value that consumers place on it. Contrary to 
what many economists of the mid-nineteenth century had thought, there is nothing intrinsic about 
value.  If consumers value hotashes, hotashes have value.  If they buy the package of hotash plus 
share, we know they value this bundle. There is no obvious way of knowing what the value of 
only the hotash is. This is what makes it difficult to prove that it is a Ponzi. Consumers have the 
right to pay what they wish for hotashes and that is what they are doing when they buy hotashes. 
This is the same reason why the widespread use of stock options to managers and consultants is 
not considered illegal. What this paper tried to show is that such practices are also disguised 
Ponzis and have probably contributed to the financial crash that occurred between 2007 and 
2009. The march of modern economy thrives on unscrupulous entrepreneurs who stay one step 
ahead of the law.  Stock options for consumers and others is one such idea. 
  The law will eventually catch up with it.  But before that happens, this may be your 
chance to make money and get away to the Bahamas
6.   
                                                 
5 This is what makes the claim of the “impossibility of Ponzi survival” almost mystical. An analogy from the natural 
sciences is the claim that no object can travel at the speed of light. This is baffling because one can construct 
examples in theory where this is not true. Consider a fan with a single blade, which does one revolution per minute. 
The speed at which the far tip of the blade travels clearly depends on the length of the blade. By increasing the 
length we can make it go ever faster. So, for every real number, we can make the blade long enough so that the tip 
travels at a speed greater than that number. Though there is no point where this argument breaks down, we know 
that as the lengthening occurs, at some point, the blade tip will not function as the argument suggests.  
6 The relief is likely to be temporary, though, since, thanks to global warming, the Bahamas is likely to go 
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